Conference Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions 2004 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3048:92-108 Likhodedov A, Sandholm T
Conference Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions 2004 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3048:92-108 Likhodedov A, Sandholm T
Conference Methods for boosting revenue in combinatorial auctions 2004 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 232-237 Likhodedov A, Sandholm T
Journal Article Preference elicitation and query learning 2004 • Journal of machine learning research • 5:649-667 Blum A, Jackson J, Sandholm T, Zinkevich M
Conference Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments 2004 266-267 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions 2004 132-141 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: Near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation 2004 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3048:73-91 Sandholm T, Gilpin A
Conference Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation 2004 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3048:73-91 Sandholm T, Gilpin A
Conference Solving combinatorial exchanges: Optimality via a few partial bids 2004 • Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004 • 3:1418-1419 Kothari A, Sandholm T, Suri S
Conference Towards a characterization of polynomial preference elicitation with value queries in combinatorial auctions 2004 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3120:1-16 Santi P, Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Using performance profile trees to improve deliberation control 2004 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 73-79 Larson K, Sandholm T
Conference Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency 2003 212-213 Likhodedov A, Sandholm T
Conference Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer 2003 • Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce • 232-233 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer 2003 232-233 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Journal Article Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms 2003 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 2833:19-36 Sandholm T
Conference Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting 2003 • Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce • 5:17-24 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Preprint AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents 2003 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents 2003 • Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning • 1:83-90 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games 2003 • Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning • 1:91-98 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Preprint BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games 2003 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Journal Article BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations 2003 • Artificial Intelligence • 145(1-2):33-58 Sandholm T, Suri S
Conference Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core 2003 • Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce • 230-231 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
