Conference Combinatorial auctions with structured item graphs 2004 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 212-218 Conitzer V, Derryberry J, Sandholm T
Conference Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games 2004 • Proceedings, Twenty-First International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2004 • 185-192 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games 2004 24 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Computing Shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains 2004 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 219-225 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Effectiveness of query types and policies for preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions 2004 • Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004 • 1:386-393 Hudson B, Sandholm T
Conference Eliciting bid taker non-price preferences in (combinatorial) auctions 2004 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 204-211 Boutilier C, Sandholm T, Shields R
Conference Experiments on deliberation equilibria in auctions 2004 • Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004 • 1:394-401 Larson K, Sandholm T
Conference Learning near-Pareto-optimal conventions in polynomial time 2004 • Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems Wang X, Sandholm T
Conference Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions 2004 268-269 Likhodedov A, Sandholm T
Conference Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions 2004 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3048:92-108 Likhodedov A, Sandholm T
Conference Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions 2004 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3048:92-108 Likhodedov A, Sandholm T
Conference Methods for boosting revenue in combinatorial auctions 2004 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 232-237 Likhodedov A, Sandholm T
Journal Article Preference elicitation and query learning 2004 • Journal of machine learning research • 5:649-667 Blum A, Jackson J, Sandholm T, Zinkevich M
Conference Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments 2004 266-267 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions 2004 132-141 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation 2004 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3048:73-91 Sandholm T, Gilpin A
Conference Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: Near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation 2004 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3048:73-91 Sandholm T, Gilpin A
Conference Solving combinatorial exchanges: Optimality via a few partial bids 2004 • Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004 • 3:1418-1419 Kothari A, Sandholm T, Suri S
Conference Towards a characterization of polynomial preference elicitation with value queries in combinatorial auctions 2004 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3120:1-16 Santi P, Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Using performance profile trees to improve deliberation control 2004 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 73-79 Larson K, Sandholm T
Conference Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency 2003 212-213 Likhodedov A, Sandholm T
